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Commentary
commercial use by claiming that revenues are necessary to
fund religious activities,19 judges cannot defer robotically to
assertions or dismissals of religious purpose. As untidy as
the inquiry may be, evidentiary probes into religious belief,
sincerity, centrality, and alternative avenues for exercise are
unavoidable in the statutory preference setting.
Finally, the Martin court's failure to flesh out why munici-
pal concerns were insufficient to outweigh the church's reli-
gious interests leaves the statutory balancing test untethered
to underlying principle. Although the court mentions, ap-
provingly, that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints had already agreed to a reduction in steeple height,
that does not provide an objective indicator for establishing
reasonableness. Would the court have found denial of a 200-
foot-tall steeple not a "reasonable" regulation if the church
had earlier jettisoned a 300-foot-tall proposal?
19. Casting commercial, revenue-generating uses in religious terms
is not unusual. See Steve Bailey, Downtown Proposal: Tower In, Chapel
Out, THE BOSTON GLOBE, p. Al, July 6,2001; St. Bartholomew's Church
v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 905 (1991) (involving an attempt to build an office tower to
finance an expanded ministry). Recognizing this possibility, a joint
statement issued by Senators Hatch and Kennedy and accompany-
ing RLUIPA, states that not every activity carried out by a religious
entity or individual constitutes "religious exercise." In many cases,
real property is used by religious institutions for purposes that are
comparable to those carried out by other institutions. While recog-
nizing that these activities or facilities may be owned, sponsored or
Conclusion
Statutes granting preferences to religious land uses inher-
ently present problems of institutional competence. They
require legislative, executive, and judicial branches of gov-
ernment to engage in case-by-case determinations about
religious institutions made awkward by the free exercise
clause, a constitutional provision whose very purpose is to
secure for religious actors a sphere of autonomy regarding
the definition of religion. If Employment Division v. Smith has
kept courts out of the messy business of finding and weigh-
ing undue burdens on religion,2 0 then statutory preferences
work just as hard to keep courts in that messy business.
Inveighing against a judicial invasion of free exercise rights,
Martin reins in an overzealous trial judge. It does not, how-
ever, supply an analytical framework capable of deciding
cases further away from the bright line of this church steeple.
operated by a religious institution, or may permit a religious institu-
tion to obtain additional funds to further its religious activities, this
alone does not automatically bring these activities or facilities within
the bill's definition or [sic] "religious exercise." For example, a
burden on a commercial building, which is connected to religious
exercise primarily by the fact that the proceeds from the building's
operation would be used to support religious exercise, is not a
substantial burden on "religious exercise." Cong. Rec. S7776 (July
27, 2000).
20. Indeed that was one of the expressly articulated purposes of
Smith. 494 U.S. at 886-87.
Martin v. Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop: Should Zoning
Accommodate Religious Uses or Vice Versa?
By Alan C. Weinstein
In Martin v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 747 N.E.2d
131 (Mass. 2001), 53 ZD XX, the highest state court in
Massachusetts ruled that the Dover Amendment,' a state
statute that denies local government the authority to "pro-
hibit, regulate or restrict the use of land or structures for
religious purposes . . " authorized the Town of Belmont to
grant a church special permission to build a steeple for a
newly built Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints temple
that was taller than the local zoning provisions would nor-
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1. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40A § 3. (2001).
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mally allow. Since Martin involved a Massachusetts statute,
normally the decision would evoke limited interest, and
have little precedential value, in other states. So why, you
may ask, am I reading four comments about the case in Land
Use Law and Zoning Digest? The answer is simple. The U.S.
Congress has ensured, in a new law, that many communities
will soon face the same basic issue in the Martin case: Should
zoning accommodate religious uses or vice versa?
THE IMPACT OF RLUIPA
In September 2000, President Bill Clinton signed into law
the Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (RLUIPA).2 RLUIPA affects all local land-use regula-
tions, including historic landmarking. It affects religious
2. Pub. L. No. 106-274, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc (2000).
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uses by imposing a "strict scrutiny" standard if such regu-
lations are challenged. In addition, RLUIPA contains pro-
visions mandating that local land-use regulations must
grant "equal treatment" to a religious assembly or institu-
tion;3 not discriminate against any assembly or institution
on the basis of religion or religious denomination;4 and
not impose or implement a land-use regulation that to-
tally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction or
unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or
structures within a jurisdiction. I
RLUIPA is the latest act in a drama, involving courts and
legislatures at both the federal and state level, that began
with a 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that the
First Amendment's free exercise clause did not warrant
exemptions from "neutral laws of general application" for
religious practitioners or institutions. 6 The decision was
promptly denounced by a broad spectrum of religious and
political groups that urged Congress to "restore" the reli-
gious protections the Court had removed. Congress responded
in 1993 by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA),7 a law that effectively overturned the Court's 1990
ruling. RFRA proved to be relatively short-lived, however;
in a 1997 decision,' the Court declared the statute unconstitu-
tional. In the wake of that decision, religious and political
groups again sought the aid of Congress in drafting a reli-
gious freedom law. Three years later, Congress enacted
RLUIPA, which its proponents claim avoids the constitu-
tional pitfalls of RFRA,9 a claim that those who opposed
RFRA dispute. 0
The turmoil has not been limited to the federal govern-
ment. Since 1990, several state supreme courts have rejected
the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to religious freedom
claims brought on state constitutional grounds" and a num-
ber of states have approved statutes or constitutional amend-
3.42 USCA § 2000 cc (b)(1) provides: "No government shall impose or
implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious
assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious
assembly or institution."
4.42 USCA § 2000 cc (b)(2) provides: "No government shall impose or
implement a land use regulation that discriminates against any assem-
bly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination."
5. 42 USCA § 2000 cc (b)(3)(A)&(B).
6. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Or-
egon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7. Pub. L. No. 103-41, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 bb - 200bb-4 (1994).
8. City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
9. See, e.g., information available on the RLUIPA website of The
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty at www.rluipa.org/index.html. See
also Stuart Meck, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,
ZONING NEWS, January 2001, at 1.
10. See, e.g., Letter of July 24, 2000 from Professor Marci A. Hamilton
to members of the Senate, analyzing RLUIPA and concluding that it is
constitutionally infirm at www.marcihamilton.com/rlpa/
rluipa_1etter.htm.
11. Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH.
LAW. 25,44 (2000).
ments comprehensively addressing religious freedom.12 Still
other states, such as Massachusetts, have adopted more
narrowly focused religious freedom laws.
How Should Local Governments Respond?
The first RLUIPA challenge was filed within days after the law
was signed and new challenges are being filed weekly. How
should local governments respond to this new law? The first
response every local government should make to RLUIPA is to
examine the text of its land-use regulations affecting religious
uses and how those regulations have been applied. At mini-
mum, the zoning ordinance must provide reasonable locational
options for new or expanding houses of worship and accessory
religious uses such as schools. Where locational options are
effectively non-existent or extremely limited, a local govern-
ment should undertake a planning study that seeks to deter-
mine how it might accommodate the needs of religious uses
without unduly harming surrounding property owners.
Local governments also should examine whether they are
making adequate locational options for "social service" uses,
such as shelters for the homeless or victims of domestic abuse
and facilities to feed the homeless and indigent. The claims of
religious institutions that a local government must allow them
to "minister to the poor" at a location of their choosing is
blunted when a zoning code designates reasonable locational
options for both secular and religious groups to provide such
services. Finally, the local government should make sure that
no religious denomination has been singled out for either
favorable or unfavorable treatment in the land-use regulatory
process and that applications from religious uses are treated no
differently than similar applications from secular uses.
NEEDED: ROOM FOR ACCOMMODATION
We are clearly in the midst of a dynamic environment-
socially, politically, and legally-regarding the conflict be-
tween religious institutions and land-use regulation. Regret-
tably, elements on both sides at times have advocated extreme
positions. Some religious institutions claim that their rights
to build a new facility, or expand an existing one, is almost
absolute and that government may never lawfully landmark
a property devoted to religious use if the congregation ob-
jects. Some local officials and citizens groups argue that
"religious freedom" should apply only to beliefs and prac-
tices, and thus decisions about where a house of worship
may locate, whether it may expand, or whether it should be
landmarked involve nothing more than property rights, and
thus a religious institution should be treated no differently
than a discount store or movie theater. There is surely room
for accommodation between these extremes."
12. See ALA. CONST. amend. 622; Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 41-1493 to 41-1493.02
(Supp. 1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-571b (West Supp. 2000); Fla. Stat. ch.
761.01-761.05 (2000); 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws 133-34; 775 11. Comp. Stat. Ann.
35/10,35/15,35/20,35/25 (West 1998); 2000 N.M. Laws 17; Okla. Stat. Ann
51 §§ 251-258 (West Supp. 2000); R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1-3 (1998); S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 1-32-10,1-32-20,1-32-30,1-32-40, 1-32-45,1-32-50,1-32-60 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1999); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 110.003-110.012
(Vernon Supp. 2000) (containing an exemption for land-use regulation).
13. In the Martin case itself, for example, the Mormons' original
application proposed a 94,100-square-foot temple topped with six steeples,
the tallest of which would rise to 156 feet. After hearing the concerns of
neighbors and town officials, the final plan reduced the size of the
temple to 68,000 square feet with a single 83-foot-high steeple.
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